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Abstract
This paper presents results from a series of second price private value auction (SPA) experiments in which
bidders are either given for free, or are allowed to purchase, noisy signals about their opponents' value. Even
though theoretically such information about oppoents' value has no strategetic use in the SPA, it provides
us with a convenient instrument to change bidders' perception about the \strength" (i.e. the value) of their
opponent. We argue that the empirical relationship between the incidence and magnitude of overbidding and
bidders' perception of the strength of their opponent provides the key to understand whether overbidding
in second price auctions are driven by \spite" motives or by the \joy of winning." The experimental data
show that bidders are much more likely to overbid, though less likely to submit large overbid, when they
perceive their rivals to have similar values as their own. We argue that this empirical relationship is more
consistent with a modied \joy of winning" hypothesis than with the \spite" hypothesis. However, neither
of the non-standard preference explanations are able to fully explain all aspects of the experimental data,
and we argue for the important role of bounded rationality. We also nd that bidder heterogeneity plays an
important role in explaining their bidding behavior.
Keywords: Overbidding, Second Price Auctions, Spite, Joy of Winning, Bounded Rationality.
JEL Classication Codes: C91, C72.
1 Introduction
Second price private value auction (SPA) is the best understood auction format from a theo-
retical point of view.1 In private value auctions, bidding one's own value is a weakly dominant
strategy. This theoretical prediction holds irrespective of bidders' risk attitudes, the number of
rival bidders, symmetry in the value distributions, and so on. In laboratory experiments, however,
subjects are found to exhibit a consistent pattern of overbidding. Kagel, Levin and Harstad (1987)
found that the actual bids are on average 11 percent above the dominant strategy bids. Kagel and
Levin (1993) nd that about 62 percent of all bids in their ve-bidder SPA sessions exceed the
bidder's value, while only 8 percent of all bids were below it. Both Kagel and Levin (1993) and
Harstad (2000) further reports that experience has small eect in reducing overbidding in SPA.
Given the robustness of the ndings of overbidding in SPA, it is surprising that economists
have very little understanding of why it happens. Kagel, Levin and Harstad (1987) conjectured
that bidding above one's own value in a SPA is based on the illusion that it improves the probability
of winning with little cost because the winner only pays the second-highest bid.2 Moreover, they
argue that overbidding is sustainable because bidders still on average earn positive prots. Finally,
overbidding is observed for experienced bidders because the negative feedback from overbidding is
a rather weak mechanism in the SPA. For example, if a bidder overbids in a SPA by 10 percent
above his value, there could be a high probability that he does not win at all and thus does not
experience any negative feedback; even if he wins, there could still be a high probability that he
obtains positive payo from winning (in stark contrast to the rst price auctions).
In a recent paper, Morgan, Steiglitz and Reis (2003) analyzed the equilibrium of standard
auctions assuming that bidders care not only about her own surplus in the event that she wins
the auction, but also about the surplus of her winning rival in the event that she loses the auction
(the \spite" motive). They showed that, when bidder's utility function includes a spite motive
component, bidders will bid more than their value in second price auctions. Andreoni, Che and Kim
(2005, ACK thereafter) conducted a set of related experiments in which bidders are partitioned into
groups where bidders within a group can perfectly observe each other's value.3 They found, among
1Vickery (1961) is the rst to study this auction format.
2Harrison (1989) used similar arguements to explain overbidding in the rst price auctions.
3The theoretical analysis in Kim and Che (2004) motivated ACK's experiments.
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other results, that overbidding is much more prevalent among \followers" { bidders whose values
are known to be lower { than \leaders," thus lending support to the spite motives in overbidding.
ACK, however, also found that their results from rst-price auction experiments instead favor a
theory of risk aversion as an explanation of the slight amount of overbidding in the FPA. The spite
motive explanation thus leaves completely unexplained about when and why subjects in a short
laboratory experiment will exhibit spite motives under one but not another auction format. Morgan,
Steiglitz and Reis' (2003) theoretical analysis also predicts overbidding in English auctions, but so
far experimental evidence suggests that overbidding in English auctions is a short term phenomenon
that subjects quickly learn not to undertake (Kagel and Levin 1993).
In this paper, we report results from a series of second price private-value auction experiments
in which subjects either receive for free or choose to purchase noisy signals about their opponent's
value.4 The key dierence between our experiments and ACK's is that, in our experiments, bidders
receive noisy but informative signals about opponent's value, whereas in ACK's experiments bidders
perfectly observe rivals' values within a group but has no information about rivals outside the
group.5 The crucial property of the noisy signals in our experiments is that, from a theoretical
perspective, they are completely useless if bidders are motivated only by monetary payos because
bidding their own private value remains the weakly dominant strategy regardless of their signals
about opponents' value. However, such noisy signals provides us with a convenient instrument to
change bidders' perception about the \strength" (i.e. the value) of their opponent.
The goal of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between the incidence and
magnitude of overbidding and bidders' perception of the strength of their opponent, and attempt
to provide a better understanding of overbidding in second price auctions from such empirical
relationships.6 We nd in our experimental data that bidders are much more likely to overbid,
though less likely to submit large overbid, when they perceive their rivals to have values similar
to their own. We argue that this empirical relationship is consistent with the \joy of winning"
hypothesis, but inconsistent with the \spite" hypothesis.
4Our experiments are motivated by the theoretical analysis in Fang and Morris (2006).
5Besides this dierence, we also conducted experiments in which bidders have to decide whether to purchase
signals about opponent's value.
6Note that the information structure in ACK's setup limits the degree of variation in bidders' perceptions about
their opponents' strength that can be achieved in their experiments.
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Our experiments are also motivated by the observation that, in many real-world auctions,
bidders typically observe (or may have incentive to acquire) information about their opponents'
values. Such information may come from gossips, espionage, or in the case of repeated auctions from
observing opponents' past bids and winnings. In these situations, the assumption of the standard
independent private value auction paradigm that bidder's belief about their opponent's value is
independent of his own types are violated. How would such information impact bidders' bidding
behavior? Is additional information a blessing or a curse for the bidders? How do such information
impact the allocative eciency and revenue? These questions, however, are not interesting at
all from a theoretical point of view: if bidders are fully rational, then in private-value SPAs,
information about opponents' value should not have impact on a bidder's bid; that is, bidding his
value remains his weakly dominant strategy, just as it is in the standard SPAs when bidders do
not have any information about opponents' value. In this paper, we show that such theoretical
predictions do not accurately describe our experimental results. In fact, we nd that bidders' bids
are systematically aected by their signals about their opponents' value. Such systematic eect of
opponents' value on the bids in the SPA provides an additional lense through which we can learn
about the incentives for overbidding in the SPA.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Second 2 presents the theoretical bench-
mark; Section 3 describes the experimental design; Section 4 presents the testable hypothesis of
\spite," \joy-of-winning" and bounded rationality explanations regarding their implications on
overbidding in SPA auctions; Section 5 analyzes the experimental data; and Section 6 discusses our
ndings and concludes.
2 Theoretical Predictions
Two bidders, i = 1; 2; compete for an object in a second-price private value auction. Bidder
i0s valuation for the object vi is private and it is independently drawn from a discrete distribution
with support fn1; :::; nLg where 0  n1 < n2 <    < nL and Pr (vi = nl) = pl 2 (0; 1) such thatPL
l=1 pl = 1: We consider two scenarios. In the rst, bidder i is given a noisy signal si about her
opponent's realized valuation vj . The signal is accurate with probability K 2 (0; 1) ; and if the
3
signal is inaccurate, it will equally likely take the other wrong values. That is,
Pr (si = nljvj = nl) = K
Pr (si = nl0 jvj = nl) =
1 K
L  1 if l
0 6= l:
Of course, to ensure that the signal si is informative about bidder j
0s valuation, K has to satisfy
K > 1=L: We refer to the parameter K as the precision of bidder's signal about their opponent's
value.
In the second scenario, bidder i is not oered free information about her opponent's valuation
vj : Rather, they are oered to purchase a signal with precision K. The price of the signal is
randomly drawn from a distribution with support [c; c] where c < c and c may be less than zero.
The bidders are asked to make the signal purchase decision before they observe their valuations.
After the bidders make the information acquisition decisions, bidders observe their private value,
and the signal about their opponent's value (if they do purchase information), and they are also
informed about whether their opponent has purchased information about their value. Bidders then
submit bids, and the higher bidder wins the object at a price of the losing bidder. Ties are broken
with a coin ip.
Suppose that bidder i receives a signal si about her opponent's value, her posterior about her
rival's value is changed according to Bayes rule as follows: bidder i perceives that her opponent j0s
value vj will take on value nl with probability
















if l 6= m:
Thus bidders' signals eectively change their perceptions about their rivals' values. However, as
long as bidders' payos are as modelled by the standard theory, which is simply their monetary
payo:
U (bi; bj ; vi) =
8>><>>:
0 if bi < bj
vi bj
2 if bi = bj
vi   bj if bi > bj ;
(1)
their perceptions about their rivals' values should have no eect on how much they should bid.
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Proposition 1 If a bidder's payo is given by (1), the unique equilibrium in weakly dominant
strategies for the SPA is as follows:
1. When information is free, a bidder of type (vi; si) should bid her private value vi regardless
of her signal about her opponent's value;
2. When information acquisition is endogenous, a bidder should purchase the information only
if the cost is negative; and they should bid vi regardless of their signal of their opponent's
value.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
3.1 General Features of All Sessions
All sessions consist of 20 rounds. Subjects are anonymously and randomly matched in two-
person groups for each round to play a second price auction. Subjects are not given any information
about the identities of other bidders. Given that the smallest of our sessions contained 10 subjects
(and sessions averaged 17 subjects), a session can be treated as a series of twenty single-shot games.
Value Distribution Prior to submitting a bid, bidders always knew their own value as well as
the distribution from which values are drawn. For all sessions values were drawn from the discrete
distribution shown in Table 1. All values are denominated in ECUs, which were converted to cash
at a rate of 1 ECU = $.01. In reporting results, earnings and costs are denominated in dollars
rather than ECUs. Values are independent across bidders and across rounds. The distribution of
values was common knowledge, although the particular values drawn were private information.
[Table 1 about here]
This value distribution approximates a Normal distribution with mean 5,000 ECUs and standard
deviation of 2,000 ECUs.7 We used a peaked distribution rather than a uniform distribution largely
7In pilot sessions we have experimented with continuous Normal distributions, but this necessitated the inclusion
of lengthy instructions on Normal distributions. We choose this discrete approximation of the Normal distribution
for simplicity.
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to generate more competitive auctions (e.g. auctions where the bidders' values are relatively close)
without changing the range of possible values.8
Signal Distribution As a treatment condition, bidders are either given for free or have the choice
to purchase noisy information about opponents' values. These signals are received simultaneously
with values, prior to bidding. The distribution of signals is as follows: With probability K; where
K is either :3 or :7 as a treatment variable, the signal that a bidder draws is exactly equal to
the value of the opposing bidder. With probability 1   K; the signal is drawn from a uniform
distribution over the other ten values. In other words, the probability of each possible incorrect
signal is (1 K) =10. The variable K measures the quality of the signal. The value of K is common
knowledge; but the signals observed by subjects are private information.
3.2 Experimental Treatments
Our experimental design has several purposes. At the simplest level, we would like to know if
bidders will respond to information about their opponent's value and whether they will be willing to
pay a positive amount for such information. If bidders are rational and maximizing their expected
monetary payo, the signals as worthless. Bidders should therefore ignore the signals and be
unwilling to pay for them. Observing otherwise extends the known anomaly of overbidding in
second price auctions.
Ultimately, our goal is not to provide a laundry list of anomalous behavior but rather to under-
stand why anomalous behavior is occurring. The two main categories of explanation that apply
here are non-standard preferences (e.g. \spite" or \joy of winning") and bounded rationality. Un-
der the rubric of bounded rationality, subjects may either be making completely random errors
or making a systematic mistake. Our experimental design is intended to separate these various
explanations for overbidding in second price auctions.
The experimental design has ve treatments split into three categories as follow.
Control Treatment [CON]. These are basic treatments in which bidders do not observe any
informative signal about opponents' values. The controls serve two purposes. Beyond serving as a
8The use of a peaked distribution also has important implications for comparing the eciency of rst and second
price auctions, a central issue in the broader design.
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baseline for comparison with the other treatments, the control treatments allow us to replicate the
qualitative results of earlier experiments on overbidding in second price auctions. With this repli-
cation in hand we can be reasonably condent that our results are not driven by any peculiarities
of our subject pool or other secondary features of the experimental environment.
Exogenously Provided Signals Treatments [EX3 and EX7]. In these treatments, at the
same time they received their private values, subjects in each round were provided with a free
signals of quality K about their opponent's values, where K is equal to :3 for the EX3 (\low
quality" signals) and :7 for the EX7 (\high quality signals") treatments. The value of K was the
same for all bidders and for all rounds of a session. The precision of the signal is explained in Section
2. While in neither case is the signal either completely informative or completely uninformative, the
signal is substantially more informative in the high quality signal treatment. For example, suppose
a bidder receives a signal of 0 about an opposing bidder. In the low quality signal treatment, the
updated expected value for the opposing bidder would be $48.41 while in the high quality signal
treatment it would be $40.87. Thus, our experimental design allows us not only to observe how
bidders respond to information about their opponent's value but also how this response varies with
the quality of the information.
Endogenous Signal Acquisition Treatments [END3 and END7]. In these treatments,
bidders are oered an opportunity to purchase a signal about their opponents' valuations. The
quality of signals oered for purchase to the subjects is respectively xed at K = :3 for END3 and
K = :7 for END7 treatments. The quality of information K is xed and known to the subjects in
each round. For each bidder in each round, a cost c, denominated in ECUs, will be drawn from
a uniform [ 50; 250] distribution. Prior to being told their private value, each subject will be told
their cost of information and asked if they wish to buy a signal. If the subject chooses to buy
information, they have c deducted from their show-up fee and, prior to bidding, receive both their
own value and signals on the values of the other bidder.9 The decision to acquire information is
9We are wary of using the standard Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit the willingness to pay
for information because of its direct relationship to a second price auction. For the BDM technique to have any value,
the instructions must carefully explain to subjects why they should bid their true value for the information. In our
SPA experiments, this amounts to giving subjects detailed instructions telling them they should follow the dominant
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known to all bidders before the bidding begins.
The endogenous signal acquisition treatments serve two important purposes. First, it allows
us to verify an important prediction of models of bounded rationality. If overbidding represents
a mistake, rather than maximization subject to non-standard preferences, subjects should learn to
stop making this mistake as they gain experience if it is costing them money. This prediction
does not require that individuals understand the nature of the mistake as reinforcement learning is
sucient to yield a reduction in errors. The critical clause here is \if it is costing them money." As
noted by Kagel and Levin (1993), one of the reasons subjects have diculty learning not to overbid
is that it only rarely costs them money. By extension, it is quite dicult to observe learning in
second price auctions. In contrast, paying a positive price for information always costs money.
If bounded rationality is a major force underlying anomalous behavior, we ought to see subjects
learning to avoid the always costly mistake of paying a positive price for information.
An additional advantage of the endogenous signal acquisition treatment is that it also allows us
to separate subjects out by types. To the extent that some subjects are more rational than others,
it is instructive to show that those who make wrong choices in one domain tend to make wrong
choices in other domains as well. Indeed this is what we nd in our empirical analysis (see Section
5.6).
3.3 Experimental Procedures
A total of 12 experimental sessions were conducted in the Fall 2003 and Spring 2004, with
subjects recruited from undergraduate students at Case Western Reserve University and Yale Uni-
versity using newspaper ads, posters, emails, and classroom announcements. These sessions are
allocated to the ve treatments as detailed in Table 2 below. The number of participants in each
session varies between 10 to 24. Subjects were only allowed to participate in a single session.
[Table 2 about here]
For the most part, the experimental procedures were quite standard. All sessions were run in
a computerized lab using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999). At the beginning of each session
the experimenter read the instructions aloud to the subjects, which were also displayed on the
strategy. We suspect this would inuence the results.
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subjects' computer screens. Before beginning to play, all subjects were asked to complete a short
quiz about the payos and the rules of the experiment.10 All subjects were given a printed table
describing the distribution of values and, where applicable, signals.
In the END3 and END7 treatments, a round began with both bidders seeing a price for infor-
mation and being asked if they wished to purchase a signal. Bidders were then shown their private
values and, when applicable, their signals { all other treatments began at this stage. Next, bidders
simultaneously chose a bid. Negative bids were not allowed and bids were capped at 99,999 ECUs,
a limit that surprisingly was reached nine times by seven dierent subjects. At the end of each
round bidders were told whether they had the high bid for the round { we purposely did not refer
to \winning" or \losing" the auction. They were also told their value and bid for the round, their
opponent's bid, and their payo for the round. When relevant, the feedback screen also reported
their signal, any expenditures on information, and their payo before and after adjusting for the
cost of information. Subjects were given a record sheet to log their history of play. While keeping
the record sheet was strictly voluntary, we observed that most subjects lled them out religiously.
At the end of the session, each subject was paid in cash for a single randomly selected round
plus their show-up fee. We pay on a randomly selected round so that income eects will not
be a confound for any learning eects. In the case that subjects lost money for the randomly
selected round, these losses were deducted from their show-up fee. We never attempted to collect
money from a subject, so losses are eectively capped at $12.11 The instructions explained the
bankruptcy rule to subjects multiple times, and the payo quiz included an example with losses.
Several subjects indeed left the experiment with a nal payo of $0. Somewhat to our surprise, none
of these subjects complained. The average payo was approximately $21 with sessions generally
lasting 60 { 75 minutes. These payos were sucient to generate a plentiful supply of subjects.
10The full text for the instructions and quiz for the EX7 treatment is given in Appendix A.
11Bidding one's value is still a dominant strategy when losses are capped at $12. Even with the losses capped, the
marginal expected payo of increasing the bid remains strictly negative at any bid greater than the value (assuming
full support for the opponent's bid function).
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4 Spite, Joy of Winning and Bounded Rationality: Testable Im-
plications
Before we describe our empirical results, in this section we briey sketch the testable implications
of three plausible explanations of overbidding in SPA: spite, joy of winning and bounded rationality.
4.1 Spite
We rst consider the \spite" hypothesis recently put forward by Morgan, Steiglitz and Reis
(2003) who argue that if bidders care not only about her own surplus in the event that she wins
the auction, but also about the surplus of her winning rival in the event that she loses the auction,
then bidders will overbid in the second price auctions.
We will rst sketch the equilibrium deviation of the SPA auction with spite-motive a la Morgan,
Steiglitz and Reis (2003) for a model in which bidders do not receive any noisy signals about
opponent's value. There are two bidders i = 1; 2; whose values are drawn from distribution F ()
with PDF f () on the support [0; 1] : Suppose that the private valuation for bidder i and j are vi
and vj respectively, and suppose that they bid bi and bj respectively. Morgan, Steiglitz and Reis'
(2003) model of bidder i0s spite motives is presented in his payo:
W (bi; bj ; vi; vj) =
8<:   (vj   bi) if j winsvi   bj if i wins; (2)
where  2 [0; 1): That is, when bidder i loses the auction, she receives a negative payo (the spite)
that is proportional to her opponent's realized surplus vj bi: Note that the standard auction model
without spite motives corresponds to the case  = 0: Now we can sketch the equilibrium for SPA
with spite-motivated bidders. Suppose that bidder 2 follows a bidding strategy  () : Bidder 1's
payo from bidding an amount b when his value is v1 and his opponent's value is v2 is
 (b; v1; v2) = [v1    (v2)] Ib(v2)    (v2   b) Ib<(v2):
Bidder 1 takes expectation over values of v2, assuming that bidder 2's bidder strategy  () is strictly
increasing in v2 :
Ev2(b; v1; v2) =
 1(b)Z
0
[v1    (v2)] f (v2) dv2   
1Z
 1(b)
(v2   b) f (v2) dv2:
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Taking the rst order derivative with respect to b; and imposing symmetric bidding equilibrium,
we obtain









f (v2) dv2 = 0:













Thus the solution is
 (v) = v +
R 1




Morgan, Steiglitz and Reis (2003) showed that equilibrium level of overbidding  (v)  v decreases
with a bidder's own value (because if a bidder's value is high, it is more likely that she will win and
her own bid will be less likely to decrease her rival's surplus). The intuition for this comparative
statics is best revealed if we assume that the opponent, say bidder 2; is following the standard
strategy of bidding her own value. When bidder 1 considers marginally raising his bid from v1;
there are three eects. First, raising one's bid leads to a marginal gain from the increase in
probability of winning; second, raising one's bid also leads to a marginal cost of winning at a price
in excess of one's valuation. In the absence of spite motives, these two eects exactly cancel out,
and thus bidding v1 is optimal. When spite incentives are present, there is a third eect: by raising
one's bid, one increases the price of the rival bidder in the event he has a higher valuation, which
happens with probability 1  F (v1) : Thus the third eect, which is a marginal benet term from
overbidding, is higher the lower a bidder's valuation. Thus, the spite motive model predicts that
in SPA control sessions, the overbidding should be decreasing with a bidder's own value if bidders
are spite-motivated.
In an environment in which bidders also privately observe noisy signals about opponents' value
(and thus bidders have multi-dimensional private types), it is not analytically possible to derive
the equilibrium of the SPA with spite-motivated bidders. However, it is possible to extend the
above intuition to obtain some comparative statics predictions about the incentives to overbid in
this environment. Suppose that the opponent, say bidder 2, is bidding her own value v2: When
bidder 1 considers marginally raising his bid above his valuation v1; there are again three eects.
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The rst two eects are the same as before and they again exactly cancel out each other, but the
third eect { by raising one's bid, one increases the price of the rival bidder in the event he has a
higher valuation { is now perceived by bidder 1 to occur with probability
Pr (v2 > v1js1) = 1  Fv2js1 (v1js1) :
In equilibrium, bidding above valuation raises the marginal cost term to just compensate for the
two marginal benet terms.
Thus the incentives to overbid in our treatments in which bidders receive noisy signals is propor-
tional to 1 Fv2js1 (v1js1) ; which is bidder 1's belief that bidder 2's value is above v1 given v1 and s1:
This perceived probability can be calculated from the Bayes' rule, and not surprisingly, it depends
on bidder 1's own valuation v1; his signal about opponent's value s1; and the signal accuracy K:
Numerical simulations for the term 1  Fv2js1 (v1js1) for information accuracy K = :3 and K = :7
respectively yield the following key predictions of the overbidding incentives for spite-motivated
bidders in environments where bidders receive noisy signals about opponents' valuation:12
Spite Hypothesis 1: Overbidding incentives decrease in bidders' own valuation vi in all treat-
ments.
Spite Hypothesis 2:
(a) Overbidding incentives is lowest when bidders' own value vi and signal si coincide;
(b) Overbidding incentives are lower when vi > si than when vi < si;
(c) Overbidding incentives increase in si when a bidder's signal si is higher than her own value vi:
Two remarks about the spite theory of overbidding in SPA are worth making. First, this theory
predicates that when subjects play in a lab experiment their spite is targeted toward fellow subjects
rather than toward the experimenter. Whether or not this assumption is valid is not clear. Second,
the equilibrium in an English auction with two spite-motivated bidders is identical to that of the
second price auction, in the benchmark model where bidders do not observe noisy signals about
opponent's values (see Proposition 3 of Morgan et. al. 2004). Thus spite motive can not explain
the observed dierence in overbidding between SPA and English auctions.
12Details about the calculations are available from the authors upon request.
12
4.2 Joy of Winning
An alternative hypothesis is that bidders overbid because they derive positive utility from
winning, over and beyond any monetary payos, which has been called the \Joy of Winning"
hypothesis. The implication of joy of winning on overbidding is easy to establish. Suppose a
bidder's valuation of an object is vi; then she receives a utility of vi + ti from winning the object,
and 0 otherwise, where ti > 0 denotes the additional joy from winning the object. Let Gi (bj jvi; si)






(vi + ti   bj) dGi (bj jvi; si) :
The optimal bid bi = vi + ti: Thus in equilibrium, a joy-of-winning theory predicts that bidders
overbid by the amount of their joy ti: That is,
Joy-of-Winning Hypothesis 0: The amount of overbidding in the simple joy-of-winning theory
is independent of the bidders' own valuation, their signals about opponent's valuation and the
signal accuracy.
Richer implications from the joy-of-winning theory can be derived in a modied model where
we make some simple behavioral assumptions about overbidding incentives. For simplicity, suppose
that ti = t for all i: Again let Gi (bj jvi; si) be bidder i0s belief about her opponent's bid given her
own type (vi; si) : Consider bidder i who is contemplating overbidding his valuation vi by : Her
expected payo from bidding  above her value vi is given by
vi+Z
0
(vi + t  bj) dGi (bj jvi; si) :
The marginal benet from overbidding is thus (taking derivative with respect to ) :
(t  ) gi (vi + jvi; si)
where gi (jvi; si) is the derivative of Gi (jvi; si) : This of course means that the optimal overbidding
is  = t: However, if we assume instead that bidders are more likely to overbid when the marginal
benet is higher, than we can conclude that the incentives to overbid will depend on the magnitude
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of (t  ) gi (vi + jvi; si) : In particular, it depends on gi (jvi; si) ; which measures bidder i0s belief
about opponent j0s bid. Just as we did heuristically for the spite motive model earlier, if bidder
i imagines that the other bidders are bidding their values, then gi (vi + jvi; si) is higher when si
is close to vi; and when the base probabilities of vi are higher (i.e. when vi is 4000, 5000 or 6000
ECUs). We restate the above discussion as two hypotheses for the modied thrill-of-winning theory:
Modied Joy-of-Winning Hypothesis 1: Overbidding is more likely when a bidder's signal si
is close to her own value vi;
Modied Joy-of-Winning Hypothesis 2: Overbidding is more likely for values with higher base
probabilities.
Finally, it is useful to point out that the thrill-of-winning story suers from the same problem
as the spite story in that it can not explain the dierence in the overbidding between SPA and
English auctions.
4.3 Bounded Rationality
To start with, we should note that overbidding is clearly not a purely random bidding error, as
overbidding occurs systematically more frequently than underbidding. However, what is the right
model for bounded rationality in auctions is a challenging question that is beyond the scope of this
paper. Here we sketch a simple model of how bounded rationality may impact overbidding.
As before, let Gi (bj jvi; si) be bidder i0s belief about opponent j0s bid distribution where (vi; si)
is bidder i0s type. Bidder i0s expected payo from bidding bi is given by
biZ
0
(vi   bj) dGi (bj jvi; si) : (3)
A perfectly rational bidder will o course choose bi to maximize the expected payo above, which
will yield a rst order condition
(vi   bi) gi (bijvi; si) = 0; (4)
implying an optimal bid of bi = vi; as predicted by standard theory.
The bounded rationality story we propose hypothesizes that bidders put a higher weight on the
impact of their bid on the probability of winning, and a lower weight on its impact on the expected
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payo conditional on winning. To be more precise, let us rewrite the expected payo (3) as
Gi (bijvi; si) E [(vi   bj) jbj  bi] :
The form of bounded rationality that we model here assume that, while bidders can fully appreciate
the positive impact of a marginal increase of bi on her probability of winning, she under-appreciates
the impact of an increase in bi on her expected payo conditional on winning E [(vi   bj) jbj  bi] :
More specically, we assume that she only appreciate 1 !  1 of the impact of bi on her expected
payo conditional on winning E [(vi   bj) jbj  bi] : Under this assumption her rst order condition
is
gi (bijvi; si) E [(vi   bj) jbj  bi] + (1  !)Gi (bijvi; si)
@E [(vi   bj) jbj  bi]
@bi
= 0;
where the rst term captures the marginal eect of bidding on the probability of winning, and
the second term captures the underweighted marginal eect of bidding on the expected payo
conditional on winning. After some manipulations, the above rst order condition is simplied to
(1  !) (vi   bi) gi (bijvi; si) + !gi (bijvi; si) E [(vi   bj) jbj  bi] = 0: (5)
Note that when ! = 0; i.e., when bidders are fully rational, the rst order condition is identical to
(4). The above rst order condition immediately implies overbidding, i.e. bi > vi; since the second
term is always positive. This can be seen directly by eliminating gi (bijvi; si) from both terms and
rewriting:
bi   vi =
!
1  !E [(vi   bj) jbj  bi] :
It can be easily shown that the amount of overbid bi   vi increases in !; the perception bias.
It is plausible to postulate that the key dierence between SPA and English auction lie in the
level of perception bias !: specically, the format of English auction makes it salient to the bidders
when they bid above their valuation that any increase in the probability of winning the objects will
result in negative payo conditional on winning, that is, in English auctions the perception bias !
is likely to be zero, at least after a few rounds of bidding. On the other hand, SPA never makes it
clear (and learning may be slow) that bidding above one's valuation only increases winning when
winning is not protable.
In terms of testable implications, the key dierence between a bounded rationality explanation
and the explanations based on non-standard preferences is as follows. If overbidding is driven by
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bounded rationality, bidders may learn to bid more accurately overtime if the errors provide strong
feedbacks; but if they are driven by non-standard preferences then the overbidding will persist
overtime. We state this as a testable hypothesis:
Bounded Rationality Hypothesis 1: If overbidding is driven by bounded rationality, bidders
may learn to bid more accurately overtime if the errors provide strong feedbacks.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 An Overview of Bidding Behavior
Figure 1 summarizes bidding behavior from our experiments. The rst cluster of bars shows
data from all ve treatments pooled together and the remaining clusters break out the ve treat-
ments. Overbids are separated into three categories: low (0 < bid { value < $12), medium ($12 
bid { value < $25), and high ($25  bid { value) overbids. The breakpoints between these three
categories are somewhat arbitrary. Overbids over $12 are suciently large that subjects could go
bankrupt and $25 represents the 90th percentile of overbids (rounded to the closest dollar). We
collectively refer to medium and high overbids as \large" overbids.
[Figure 1 about here]
Consistent with previous experimental ndings from Kagel and Levin (1993), there is frequent
overbidding in all ve treatments. Pooling across all treatments, 40% of all observations are overbids
(compared with 64% in Kagel and Levin, 1993) and 76% of the subjects overbid at least once.
Overbids are more than twice as common as underbids (16%), making it unlikely that overbidding
can be explained as purely random noise. Many overbids cannot be characterized as small mistakes.
Large overbids (e.g. overbids > $12) occur for 18% of all observations and 44% of all subjects have
at least one large overbid.13
13Our focus is on overbidding, but some other statistics are worth noting. Ignoring observations in which the two
bidders have equal values, 87% of all auctions are ecient (e.g. the bidder with the higher value wins). The average
revenue across all treatments is $40.82.
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Overbidding does not vanish with experience, again consistent with the existing experimental
results. Compare behavior in the rst ve periods with behavior in the remaining fteen periods.14
Pooling across all treatments, the frequency of overbidding rises somewhat from 35% to 42%. This
does not reect a decrease in rational behavior as the proportion of observations for which the
bid and value are equal also rises, from 37% to 47%. Instead, there is a dramatic decrease in the
proportion of underbids (e.g. bid < value), which decrease from 28% of the observations to 11%.
This suggests that underbids are largely being driven by mistakes. The growth in overbids takes
place primarily for the low overbids which grow from 19% to 24% of all observation. In contrast,
the proportion of high overbids (e.g. overbid  $25) remains steady at 10% in both the rst ve
and remaining fteen periods.
A quick visual inspection of Figure 1 shows that the frequency and nature of overbidding diers
across treatments. Overbidding is more common in the control treatment (52%) than any other
treatment. Comparing the two treatments with K = :3 with the corresponding treatments with
K = :7, bidding one's value is more common with better information and large overbids (e.g.
bid { value  $12) are less frequent. This is true both with exogenously provided signals and
endogenous signal acquisition. Beyond Figure 1, behavior also diered between the two locations.
Overbids were more likely among subject from Case (45% of all observations) than Yale (34% of
all observations). This dierence was even more noticeable if we focus on large overbids which are
more than twice as likely for Case subjects (23% of all observations) than Yale subjects (11% of all
subjects).
Not only is overbidding frequent, it is costly as well. Table 3 shows that irrational bidding,
including both over- and under- bids, causes substantial payo losses for bidders. The rst column
lists the average bidder payos, both pooled and broken down by treatments.15 The second column
lists what the average payos would have been if all subjects had bid rationally (e.g. bid =
value) against their opponent's actual bids. The dierence between column 1 and 2 measures how
much bidders could have beneted by unilaterally changing to rational bidding. Pooling across
all treatments, bidding rationally would have increased subjects' average payos by 15%. If only
14Splitting the data unevenly into early and late periods gives a better sense of the dynamics than splitting it
evenly, as most changes are conned to the early periods.
15Throughout this table, costs of acquiring information are not included in the payo calculation.
17
overbids are considered, average payos would have been increased 37% by bidding rationally ($7.56
versus $10.40). Column 3 shows what the average payo would have been if subjects, using their
actual bids, had faced opponents who bid rationally. Irrational bidding, particularly overbidding,
generates a negative externality for other subjects reducing average payos by 10%. Column 4
reports what the average payos would have been if all subjects had bid rationally and faced others
who bid rationally. Comparing columns 1 and 4, subjects' average payos are 24% lower than they
would be if all bidders behaved rationally.
[Table 3 about here]
5.2 How Do Signals Aect Bidding?
We now turn to one of the central questions raised by our experimental design: how do signals
aect bidding? To answer this question we focus on data from the treatments with exogenously
provided signals, EX3 and EX7, as the eect of signals on bidding is confounded with the decision
to purchase information in the endogenous signal acquisition treatments.
Figure 2 illustrates the complex relationship between bidding behavior and the signals received
by bidders. The data for this gure is drawn from observations in EX3 and EX7 where $40  value
 $60. By focusing on these intermediate values we allow for signals both substantially larger and
substantially smaller than the bidder's value. The conclusions we draw from this limited dataset
extend to the full dataset as will be demonstrated in the regression analysis presented below.
Observations are broken into ve categories based on the dierence between signal and value. The
rst cluster of bars, on the left of the gure, shows the proportion of overbids as a function of the
dierence between signal and value. The probability of overbidding is a hill-shaped function (like
a peaked function, but not as dramatic), with overbids most likely when the auction is perceived
to be competitive (e.g. signal and value are relatively close).
[Figure 2 About Here]
Underlying the modest response of the frequency of overbidding to the signals are strong but
diering responses by low, medium, and high overbids. The remaining two clusters of bars in Figure
2 compare pooled low and medium overbids (e.g. overbid < 25) with high overbids (e.g. overbid
 $25). For the lower two categories of overbids, the probability function is strongly peaked and
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almost perfectly symmetric.16 In contrast, the probability function for high overbids is U-shaped.
The right arm of the U, representing cases where the signal is much greater than the bidder's value,
appears higher than the left arm. Overbidding is not a heterogenous phenomenon. Overbids,
particularly low overbids, are most frequent when the auction is perceived to be competitive, but
the largest overbids tend to occur when the auction is perceived to be non-competitive, especially
when the bidder seems to have little chance of winning.
These diering responses suggest diering motives underlying overbids. Ignoring bounded
rationality for the time being, a spite-based model predicts that the probability function of over-
bidding should be an increasing function of the dierence between the signal and value while a
joy-of-winning model predicts a peak-shaped function (see the discussions in Section 4.1 and 4.2).
Ignoring the highest overbids, the data is consistent with the joy-of-winning model. However, the
asymmetry of the probability function for high overbids suggests that spite is playing an important
role for this class of overbids.
Finding 1: (Incidence of Overbidding) Subjects are more likely to overbid, but overbid to a
lesser extent, in seemingly competitive auctions.
5.3 Statistical Analysis of the Impact of Signals on Overbidding
Thus far we have only used a subset of the data to support the preceding nding and our
analysis has been limited to a strictly visual examination of the data. To put ourselves on rmer
ground we now turn to formal statistical analysis. Table 4 reports the results of Probit regressions
studying the eect of signals on overbidding.
[Table 4 About Here]
In using Probits, we focus on the probability of overbidding (or of particular types of overbids)
rather than on trying to explain the magnitude of overbids. This necessarily involves discarding
a great deal of information from the dataset. However, any statistical model that attempts to
treat overbids as a continuous variable is going to be fraught with diculties because of the large
16If the low and medium overbids are considered separately,the probability function is peaked in both cases (but
more so for the low overbids).
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spike at an overbid of zero. Our use of Probits also makes it simple to consider dierent types of
overbids separately.
For the regressions shown in Table 4, the dataset consists of all bids from the CON, EX3, and
E7 treatments. Note that an observation is a bid, not an auction, so there is one observation for
each subject in each period. For Models 1 and 2, the dependent variable is a dummy for an overbid
(e.g. bid > value). In Model 3 the dependent variable is a dummy for low and medium overbids
(e.g. overbid < 25) and in Model 4 the dependent variable is a dummy for high overbids (e.g.
overbid  $25). The base for all regressions is the control session. As independent variables, all of
the regressions include dummies for the EX3 and EX7 treatments, the bidder's value (denominated
in 1000s of ECUs), a dummy for periods 6 { 20, and a dummy for whether the session took place
at Yale. Models 2 { 4 also include the absolute value of the dierence between the bidder's signal
about his opponent's value and his value. This is interacted with a dummy for the treatments with
exogenously provided signals as the variable is not dened in the control sessions. The dierence
between the signal and value is then interacted with a dummy for the dierence being positive and
a dummy for the dierence being negative, creating two independent variables. Separating positive
and negative dierences between a bidder's signal and value allows for asymmetric responses to
information.
Model 1 allows us to identify basic treatment eects. It partly conrms our observation that the
control session yields more overbidding as both the EX3 and EX7 parameters are negative. Only the
EX7 parameter is statistically signicant in Model 1, but if we replace the EX3 and EX7 dummies
with a single dummy for the treatments with exogenous signal provision, the resulting parameter
is negative and statistically signicant at the 5% level. Unlike our impression from Figure 1, the
dierence between EX3 and EX7 is negative but not statistically signicant.17 Contrary to the
prediction of a spite model, the parameter estimate for \Value" is positive, albeit not signicantly
so. The signicant positive estimate for \Periods 6 { 20" should not be taken as evidence that
subjects are not learning as it largely reects the sharply decreased likelihood of underbidding with
experience rather than a move away from bidding one's value.
17If we consider high overbids (e.g. overbid  $25) rather than all overbids, the dierence between EX3 and EX7
is signicant at the 1% level.
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Model 2 explores the eect of signals of the likelihood of overbidding. The parameter estimates
for \Exogenous*(Signal { Value)*(Signal > Value)" and \Exogenous*(Signal { Value)*(Signal <
Value)" are both negative and statistically signicant at least at the 5% level. The dierence
between these two parameters is not statistically signicant. The same general pattern is observed
in Model 3, with a dummy for low and medium overbids as the dependent variable, but the measured
eect is stronger. Removing the interaction with the sign of the dierence, the marginal eect of
dierence between the signal and the value is 46% more negative for low and medium overbids than
for all overbids combined.18 Once again the dierence between positive and negative dierences
is not statistically signicant. The results of Model 4, with a dummy for high overbids as the
dependent variable, are quite dierent from those for Models 2 and 3. The parameter estimate for
\Exogenous*(Signal { Value)*(Signal > Value)" is positive and statistically signicant while the
estimate for \Exogenous*(Signal { Value)*(Signal < Value)" is actually slightly negative (although
nowhere close to statistical signicance). The dierence between these two parameter estimates is
statistically signicant.19
For the most part the regressions contained in Models 2 { 4, which use all of the data rather
than only a subset with intermediate values, conrm our impressions from Figure 2. As a function
of the dierence between a bidder's signal and value, the probability of overbidding is peaked,
consistent with a \joy of winning" model. This pattern is more extreme if attention is restricted
to low and medium overbids, but breaks down for high bids. The one surprise from the regressions
is that our observation that the probability of high overbids is a lop-sided U-shaped is not quite
correct. The left arm of the U is actually non-existent while the right arm is quite robust. This is
the one case in which the data is consistent with a model of spite as high overbids are most likely
when they are likely to harm the bidder's opponent without aecting his own payo.
The regression analysis shown in Table 4 can be extended to answer additional questions about
the data. Consider interacting the two variables measuring the dierence between signals and values
with a dummy for the EX7 treatment. We have rerun Models 2 { 4 with these two interaction
terms added to the models. None of the interaction terms are statistically signicant even at the
18Comparing Models 2 and 3 directly, the marginal eect is 125% larger for positive dierences and virtually the
same for negative dierences.
19As secondary results, the parameter estimate for periods 6 - 20 is no longer statistically signicant and high bids
are signicantly less likely in the Yale population.
21
10% level. It does not appear that bidder's responses to information depends on the quality of this
information. This should not come as a great surprise given the general diculty experimental
subjects have with Bayesian updating.
The results are more interesting if we interact the two variables measuring the dierence between
signals and values with the dummy for periods 6 { 20. Once again we rerun Models 2 { 4 with these
two interaction terms added. In Models 2 and 3 the new variables have little impact, failing in all
cases to achieve statistical signicance at any standard level. However, in Model 4 the interaction
term with \(Signal { Value)*(Signal > Value)" is negative and signicant at the 5% level. This
negative eect osets 60% of the positive marginal eect for \(Signal { Value)*(Signal > Value)."
With experience, the probability of subjects choosing a high overbid no longer depends strongly
on the signal being greater than the value (although the eect is still statistically signicant at the
10% level). This instability should be counted as a mark against models of spite as an explanation
of overbidding.
5.4 Are Subjects Learning to Not Overbid?
Understanding how subjects' behavior changes with experience can be critical for separating
explanations of overbidding that rely on non-standard preferences from those based on bounded
rationality. If overbidding is largely a mistake, subjects should learn to stop making this mistake to
the extent it is costly. As established in Table 4, overbidding increases with experience. However,
in most cases subjects face no cost from overbidding. Only in 7% of all observations (and only
18% of all observations with overbids) do subjects overbid and lose money. In this subsection we
explore whether costly overbidding causes subjects to learn not to overbid.
[Figure 3 About Here]
The data shown in Figure 3 indicates that subjects do learn from costly overbids. This data is
drawn from all ve treatments. The left pair of bars is based on data from all observation in which
the bidder overbid in the previous period. In other words, the lagged bid was greater than the
lagged value for these observations. The data is split into observations where this lagged overbid
did not cause a loss and observations where, in the previous period, the bidder overbid, won the
auction, and lost money. Only the latter case provides the correct experience for subjects to learn
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to not overbid. The graph reports the proportion of overbids in the current period for each of
these cases. Not surprisingly, subjects who overbid in period t  1 also tend to overbid in period
t. However, they are 13% less likely to do so if overbidding led to a loss. Breaking the data down
by treatment, a subject who overbid in period t   1 is less likely to overbid in period t in all ve
treatment. This suggests that this relationship is not likely to be a coincidence. The right pair
of bars reports data from all observations where the bidder had a high overbid (e.g. bid { value 
$25) in the previous period. These bars show the proportion of high overbids in the current period,
once again split by whether the bidder lost money in the previous period. High overbids are 12%
less likely to be repeated if the bidder lost money. This pattern is again present across all ve
treatments.
[Table 5 About Here]
The regressions shown in Table 5 put our observations from Figure 3 on a rmer statistical basis.
For both regressions the data set is all observations from all treatments except for observations from
period 1. These are discarded to allow the use of lagged variables. For Model 1 the dependent
variable is a dummy for whether an overbid occurred in the current period and for Model 2 the
dependent variable is a dummy for whether a high overbid was observed. The control treatment
serves as the base. As independent variables, both regressions include dummies for the other four
treatments (EX3, EX7, END3, and END7), the value (denominated in 1000s of ECUs), a dummy
for periods 6 { 20, and a dummy for the location. A number of lagged dependent variables are
included in both regressions. The critical variable in Model 1 is a dummy for whether the bidder
overbid in the previous round and lost money. Similarly, the variable of interest in Model 2 is a
dummy for whether the bidder submitted a high overbid in the previous period and lost money. If
subjects are learning from negative experience to avoid a mistake, the estimates for these critical
parameters should be negative. The other lagged dependent variables in Models 1 and 2 play an
important role as well. Suppose we rerun Model 1 with no lagged dependent variables other than
the dummy for having overbid and lost money in the preceding round. The resulting parameter
estimate for this dummy is positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level. This does not
indicate that subjects are somehow learning to overbid more following a negative experience, but
instead reects the strong individual eects in the data. Essentially, we are regressing on the xed
eects. Including a dummy for the lagged overbid takes care of this problem. The parameter of
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interest now measures the eect of losing money subject to having overbid. Dummies for lagged large
overbids (bid { value  $12) and lagged high overbids (bid { value  $25) allow for the possibility
that the magnitude of the lagged overbid could drive a negative estimate for \Lagged Overbid
and Lose Money." Losing money is more likely as the overbid increases. If there is regression
to the mean in overbids and no variables controlling for the magnitude of the lagged overbid are
present in the regression, a negative estimate for \Lagged [High] Overbid and Lose Money" may
result even if no learning is taking place.20 The dummy for \Lagged Overbid and Win" allows for
the possibility that winning, rather than winning and losing money, drives a negative estimate for
\Lagged Overbid and Lose Money." If subjects have a taste for winning, satiation could lead to a
negative estimate.
The results for Models 1 and 2 are consistent with our observations from Figure 3 as the estimate
for \Lagged [High] Overbid and Lose Money" is negative and statistically signicant in both cases.
When given the correct experience, subjects are less likely to either overbid or choose a high overbid.
This indicates that any explanation of overbidding must include a bounded rationality component.
Finding 2: (Learning to not Overbid) The evidence is consistent with subjects learning from
costly overbidding to avoid mistakes. The apparent stability of overbidding is due to a paucity
of opportunities to learn the costs of overbidding rather than a failure to learn from relevant
experience.
5.5 The Demand for Signals
We begin our discussion of the sessions with endogenous signal acquisition by examining when
signals are acquired. Recall that the standard theoretical prediction about the demand for signals
is very simple: a bidder should acquire a signal only if it has a negative price (see Proposition 1).
Moreover, the theory predicts that bidders should pay no attention to the signals even if one is
acquired as a result of a negative price. Given our earlier observations that subjects respond to
their signals in the treatments with exogenously provided signals, our realistic expectation is that
at least some subjects will pay for signals. Our goal is to determine whether there is a systematic
20We have considered a variety of alternative specications to control for the magnitude of the lagged overbid,
including continuous function rather than the step function used here. The main results are robust to these alterna-
tive.
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pattern to when signals are acquired. We are particularly interested in whether signal acquisition
fades with experience as this would be clear evidence of subjects learning to avoid a mistake.
[Figure 4 About Here]
Figures 4 graphs the demand curve for signals. Purchases of information are quite common.
The signal is purchased for 35% of all observations, including 22% of observations where the cost
of information is strictly positive. Most subjects (72%) purchase information at a positive cost
at least once. Ignoring the fact that the information subjects purchase is intrinsically useless for
their monetary payos, subjects are fairly rational in their purchase decisions. The likelihood
of purchasing information decreases monotonically in the cost and subjects are more likely to
purchase high quality signals at a positive cost (25%) than low quality signals (18%). Subjects
at Case were slightly more likely to purchase signals at positive price than those at Yale (23%
vs. 18%). Consistent with learning, the likelihood of purchasing information at a positive price
decreases with experience, dropping from 28% in the rst ve periods to 19% for the remaining
fteen periods.
There is a clear link between overbidding and purchasing signals. There are sixteen subjects
(out of 64 in the endogenous signal acquisition sessions) who never overbid. These subjects only
purchase signals for 7% of the observations with a positive cost, compared with 26% for subjects
who overbid at least once.
[Table 6 About Here]
The preceding conclusions are made more formally by the Probit regression shown in Table
6. The data set for these regressions is all observations from sessions with endogenous signal
acquisition (END3 and END7). The dependent variable is a dummy for whether a signal was
purchased. As independent variable, both regressions include a dummy for observations with a
negative cost, the cost of a signal interacted with a dummy for observations with a (weakly) positive
cost, a dummy for periods 6 { 20, a dummy for the location, and a dummy for the quality of the
signal. Model 2 also includes a dummy that equals 1 if the subject never overbid in any of the
twenty periods.
The results from Model 1 provide mixed support for our preceding observations. The parameter
estimate for the cost of information (subject to the cost being negative) is negative and signicant
25
at the 1% level, indicating that the demand curve for signals is downward sloping. The coecient
for periods 6 { 20 is also negative and is signicant at the 5% level. With experience subjects
are signicantly less likely to pay for information. This gives further credence to the idea that
any explanation of overbidding must include a component of bounded rationality. Although the
estimate for END7 is positive, it surprisingly fails to achieve statistical signicance. It appears that
any response by subjects to the quality of information is weak at best. The weak location eect
we observed in the descriptive statistics also turns out (non-surprisingly) not to be signicant.
In Model 2, the dummy for subjects who never overbid is negative and signicant at the 1%
level. Overbidding and purchasing signals are closely connected phenomena, suggesting that these
\mistakes" share a common cause. It is worth noting that the dummy for END7 becomes signicant
at the 5% level in Model 2.
Finding 3: (Purchasing Costly Information) Subjects decisions to purchase costly informa-
tion are consistent with rational choice, but, critically, subjects learn with experience to not
purchase costly information.
5.6 The Connection Between Signal Purchase and Overbidding
[Figure 5 About Here]
As suggested above, there is a strong link between purchasing information and overbidding.
This relationship is illustrated by Figure 5. The bidding data shown in this gure is drawn from
the sessions with endogenously acquired signals (END3 and END7) and only includes observation
with a positive cost for information. As in Figure 1, bids have been broken down into ve
categories: underbids, bids equal to the value, and low, medium, and high overbids. The rst
cluster of bars is drawn from observations where a signal is purchased. The second cluster shows
observations where a signal was not purchased. The nal cluster shows observations from the
eighteen subjects who never purchase information at a positive cost. Given that all of these
subjects have numerous opportunities to purchase information at a positive price (all eighteen have
at least twelve observations with a positive cost), they can be classied as strongly following the
theoretical prediction of no costly signal purchases.21
21The minimum positive cost for information faced by these eighteen subjects was 54 ECUs (with an average of 15
ECUs), so it is dicult to argue that they never had the opportunity to purchase information at a reasonable price.
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Subjects who pay a positive cost for information are far more likely to overbid (and underbid
as well) than those who do not. Subject to overbidding, subjects who purchase information
at a positive cost are more likely to have large overbids. The relationship between purchasing
information and overbidding becomes especially clear when those subjects who never purchase
information at a positive cost are considered. These subjects bid their value for 72% of the
observations while large overbids (e.g. bid - value  $12) are chosen for only 3% of all observations.
This is as close to the theoretical prediction as we could ever hope to see. The subject population
appears to be heterogeneous, consisting of types whose behavior, both in purchasing information
and in bidding, is consistent with the theoretical predictions and types who violate the theoretical
predictions across the board.
[Table 7 About Here]
The Probit regressions reported in Table 7 explore how purchasing information aects subjects'
likelihood of overbidding. For all of these regressions the dependent variable is a dummy for
overbidding. As independent variables, all of the regression include a dummy for high quality
information (END7), the value (denominated in 1000s of ECUs), a dummy for periods 6 { 20, and
a location dummy.
The data set for Model 1 is all observations from END3 and END7 with a positive cost for
information. This regression includes a dummy for purchasing information as an independent vari-
able. The parameter estimate associated with this variable is positive and statistically signicant
at the 1% level { purchasing information is strongly associated with overbidding. The problem
with interpreting this result is causality { do informed bidders behave less rationally because they
are informed or because they are the same types who think the (worthless) information has value.22
We have run probit regressions testing whether the number of observations with a positive price or the minimum
positive price has predictive value for whether a subject ever purchases costly information. While both parameter
estimates have the correct sign, neither even approaches statistical signicance. As such it must be considered more
than a coincedence that these subjects never paid a positive cost for information.
22As an alternative method of answering this question, we have run probit regressions which instrument for buying
information. Specically, we use a dummy for negative costs and the cost of information interacted with a dummy for
positive costs as instruments. This takes advantage of the exogeneity of information costs. The resulting parameter
estimate has just about the same marginal eect as shown in Model 1 but no longer achieves statistical signicance.
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The inclusion of negative costs for information in the experimental design helps us to sort out
this question. Model 2 includes only observations for which the cost of a signal was negative. Since
information is purchased in 99% of these observations, our sample can be treated as if subjects
are exogenously informed. The key variable in Model 2 is a dummy is for whether a subject
ever purchased information with a positive cost, either before or after the current observation. If
overbidding and purchasing costly information are driven by a common type, this dummy should
be highly correlated with this type. Since subjects are (essentially) exogenously informed in the
restricted sample for Model 2, \Ever Purchase at Cost  0" is not correlated with subjects' current
information. Thus, its coecient measures the inuence of type separate from any direct eect of
being informed. The parameter estimate for \Ever Purchase at Cost  0" is negative and signicant
at the 5% level. The marginal eect of this variable is almost identical to the marginal eect for
\Signal Purchased" in Model 1 (21% versus 17%). This result suggests that most of the eect of
becoming informed in Model 1 is driven by a subject's type rather than being informed per se.23
Model 3 looks at the question of whether giving information to subjects has any eect indepen-
dent of subjects' types. We restrict the sample to those subjects whose actions indicate they believe
the information is worthless, subjects who never paid a positive cost for information. This yields
only a small dataset (18 subjects). As such, any results reported in Model 3 should be considered
as suggestive at best. The reader particularly should be aware that the correction for clustering
yields biased estimates of the standard errors when the number of clusters is small as is the case
here (see Wooldridge, 2003, for example). The central variable in the regression is a dummy for
whether the cost of information is negative. Given that information is almost always purchased
in this case, this is equivalent to estimating the eect of exogenously provided information. The
coecient for this variable is positive but only weakly signicant, suggesting that giving subjects
information leads to more overbidding independent of their type.24
23We have rerun Models 1 and 2 using high overbids (e.g. overbid  $25) as the dependent variable. The
conclusions are virtually the same. The estimates for \Signal Purchased" in Model 1 and \Ever Purchase at Cost
 0" are positive and signicant at least at the 5% level, and the marginal eects for these two variables are almost
identical (8% in both cases).
24 If Model 3 is redone with high overbids as the dependent variable, the parameter estimate for \Cost < 0" becomes
tiny and statistically insigncant. This reinforces our impression that any impact of information on overbidding,
independent of type, is weak.
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Finding 4: (Heterogeneity) There is a strong relationship between signal purchase and overbid-
ding. This relationship appears to be based on a common type rather than a causal relationship
where becoming informed leads to overbidding.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper reports results from a series of second price auction experiments, where bidders
are presented with exogenous signals about opponents' value, or with opportunities to purchase
signals about opponents' value. Such signals are theoretically useless for the bidders if they are only
concerned about their monetary payos, as assumed by standard auction models; but it provides a
convenient way to change the bidders' perceptions about the value of their rivals. We examine how
subjects' incidence and magnitude of overbidding varies with their perceptions about how their
own value compares with that of their opponent, and use the empirical ndings to shed new light
to the question of why bidders overbid in second price auctions.
Our central goal in designing these experiments was to separate out various explanations for
overbidding in second price auctions. Ex ante, the scale was tilted in favor of explanations that
involve bounded rationality. Otherwise the dierences between sealed bid second price auctions and
English auctions are quite troublesome. Indeed, our experiments provide clear evidence in support
of bounded rationality, as we nd clear evidence of learning both in avoiding costly overbidding and
in subjects' choices to purchase costly information. As to the nature of this bounded rationality,
it is unlikely that a single cause for overbidding can be identied. Random errors do not appear
to be the dominant explanation { the well-behaved demand for costly information argues strongly
otherwise.
We also nd that non-standard preferences may be partly responsible for the overbidding. Our
experimental design provides us with the opportunity to see how the incidence and magnitude of
overbidding reacts to bidders' perceptions about how their own value compares with that of their
opponent. We nd that bidders are more likely to overbid, though they are less likely to submit
large overbids (e.g. overbid  $25), when they perceive that their own values are relatively close
to that of their opponents. This is inconsistent to the \spite" hypothesis of overbidding, but lends
support to a modied \joy of winning" hypothesis (see the hypothesis listed in Section 4).
Finally, we nd that bidder heterogeneity is playing an important role in our data. There is
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a group of subjects in our dataset whose behavior is almost completely in line with the standard
theoretical predictions. These subject do not purchase costly information and rarely overbid. Other
subjects get everything wrong, both purchasing costly information and overbidding. These results
are important for predicting the external validity of the experimental results. In the laboratory,
overbidding can only be extinguished through learning, but in the eld selection can play an equally
important role. Given that there exist subjects who bid according to the theory, forces of selection
may quickly drive out those subjects who are prone to overbidding.
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Table 1 
Distribution of Values 
 
Value Probability (%)
0 ECUs 1 % 
1,000 ECUs 3 % 
2,000 ECUs 6 % 
3,000 ECUs 12 % 
4,000 ECUs 18 % 
5,000 ECUs 20 % 
6,000 ECUs 18 % 
7,000 ECUs 12 % 
8,000 ECUs 6 % 
9,000 ECUs 3 % 
10,000 ECUs 1 % 
Table 2 






K = .3 
Exogenous 
K = .7 
Endogenous 
K = .3 
Endogenous 
K = .7 




















Effect of Irrational Play on Payoffs, Subject Averages 
(Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
Session Type 
Actual Play vs. 
Actual Opponent *
Rational Play vs. 
Actual Opponent 
Actual Play vs. 
Rational Opponent*































































* These payoffs exclude any costs/benefits from purchasing information. 
Table 4 
Response to Signals: Probit Regressions on Data from CON, EX3, and EX7  
Standard Errors Controlled for Clustering, 144 Subjects, 2842 Observations 
 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable All Overbids All Overbids Overbids < $25 Overbids ≥ $25
EX3 


























































Log-Likelihood -1889.66 -1884.58 -1698.87 -944.37 
 
Notes:  Constants have been suppressed. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Values and signals are denominated in 1000s of ECUs. 
Table 5 
Learning: Probit Regression on All Data 
Standard Errors Controlled for Clustering 
208 Subjects, 3914 Observations 
 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable All Overbids Overbids ≥ $25 
EX3 























Value .019 (.019) 
-.030 
(.020) 













Lagged Overbid ≥ $12 .190 (.117) 
.524***
(.114) 





Lagged[High] Overbid and Win -.034 (.090) 
-.058 
(.207) 





Log Likelihood -1914.76 1074.19 
 
Notes:  Constants have been suppressed. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Values and signals are denominated in 1000s of ECUs. 
 
Table 6 
Demand for Information: Probit Regressions on Data from END3 and END7 
Standard Errors Controlled for Clustering 
64 subjects, 1280 observations 
 
 (1) (2) 
























Never Overbid  -1.186
***
(.307) 
Log-likelihood -514.14 -472.03 
 
Notes:  Constants have been suppressed. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Costs are denominated in 1000s of ECUs. 
Table 7 
Information Purchase and Overbidding: Probit Regressions on Data from END3 and END7 
Standard Errors Controlled for Clustering 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Data Set Cost ≥ 0 64 subjects, 1063 obs. 
Cost < 0 
63 subjects, 217 obs. 
Never Purchase  
18 subjects, 360 obs. 
END7 




























(.154)   
Ever Purchase at Cost ≥ 0  .593
**
(.279)  
Cost < 0   .465
*
(.246) 
Log-likelihood -645.48 -130.60 -155.98 
 
Notes:  Constants have been suppressed. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
























Bid < Value Bid = Value Value < Bid < Value + $12 Value + $12 ≤ Bid < $25 Value + $25 ≤ Bid
Figure 2













Signal ≤ Value - 4000 Value - 3000 ≤ Signal ≤ Value - 1000 Signal = Value
Value + 1000 ≤ Signal ≤ Value + 3000 Signal ≥ Value + 4000
Figure 3










































































Bid < Value Bid = Value Value < Bid < Value + $12 Value + $12 ≤ Bid < $25 Value + $25 ≤ Bid
A Appendix: Instructions and Quiz for EX7 Treatment
Introduction
Today you are participating in a decision making experiment. These instructions describe a game that
you will play 20 times. To make money in this experiment you must follow the instructions closely. Your
payos in this experiment will depend on the choices made by you and the other players you are matched
with. You will be given $12.00 for coming on time. This $12.00 and any money that you earn during the
experiment will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment. It is possible to lose money in this
experiment. Any losses will be deducted from your $12.00. Your total payo will always be non-negative.
You should feel free to make as much money as possible. Money has been provided for this experiment by
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University (Faculty Research Fund at Case Western
Reserve University).
If you have any questions while these instructions are being read, please raise your hand and we will
attempt to answer your questions. Please do not talk with the other subjects, even to ask questions about
the instructions. If we hear you talking at any point in the experiment other than to talk with me or one of
my assistants, you will be removed from the room and will not receive any payment. You will be barred from
participating in any future economics experiments at Yale University (Case Western Reserve University).
Matching
For each round of play you will be randomly and anonymously paired with another player. You will not
know whom you are matched with nor will any other bidder know whom you are matched with while you
are playing the games. Further, no bidder will know whom he or she was matched with after the experiment
is nished. To repeat, you are not being matched against the same individual in each round. The matching
is randomly redone at the beginning of each round.
Experimental Currency
All experimental payos are denominated in experimental currency units (ECUs). Your ECU earnings
will be converted to dollars at the end of the experiment at a conversion rate of 100 ECUs equal one dollar.
For example, suppose you have earned 1525 ECUs in the experiment. This would be divided by one hundred
to give you a monetary payo of $15.25. With your show-up fee of 12 dollars, this would give you total
earnings of $27.25 for the session.
Auction Rules: Part One
In each round of the experiment, you will have the opportunity to bid on a single unit of a ctitious
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commodity. This ctitious commodity will have some \value" to you - you can think of this value as being
the amount of money (in ECUs) that we will pay you for the item if you obtain it in the auction. Before
any bidding takes place in any round, you will be told the value of the ctitious commodity to you. The
other bidder you are matched with will know his or her own value for the ctitious commodity. You will
also have some information about the value of the ctitious commodity for the bidder you are matched with.
The bidder you are matched with will also have information about your value. How the values for you and
the other bidder will be generated is described in detail below. How the information you have about others'
values (and they have about your value) is generated is also described in detail below.
You and the bidder matched with you will submit bids for the ctitious commodity. (The computer
screen will show an abbreviated summary of the instructions, your value, and your information about the
values of others. You will then be prompted to submit a bid.) Like the values, these bids will be denominated
in ECUs. Your bid must be in whole numbers (no fractions or decimals will be allowed). Negative bids will
not be allowed. You will not know the bid of the bidder you are matched with at the time you submit a bid,
nor will the bidder matched with you know your bid when they are choosing a bid.
Auction Rules: Part Two
The high bidder in an auction will obtain the unit of the ctitious commodity. The high bidder pays the
second highest bid for the ctitious commodity. The high bidder's payo (in ECUs) for the auction is then
the dierence between their value for the ctitious commodity and the second highest bid for the ctitious
commodity:
Payo of High Bidder = (Value of Commodity)  (Second Highest Bid).
The low bidder does not obtain a unit of the ctitious commodity and has a payo of zero.
If there is a tie for the high bid, one of the high bidders is randomly selected to obtain the unit of the
ctitious commodity. In this special case, the second highest bid is equal to the highest bid. The individual
who is not picked as the winner will receive a payo of zero in that round.
For example, you have a value of 5,000 ECUs. Suppose the other bidder matched with you for the round
bids 4,000 ECUs. If you bid 4,500 ECUs, you obtain the unit of the ctitious commodity at a price of 4,000
ECUs (the second highest bid) and earn a payo of 1,000 ECUs (5,000 - 4,000 = 1,000). If you bid 3,500
ECUs, you do not obtain the unit of the ctitious commodity and earn a payo of 0 ECUs.
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All of the rounds of the experiment are independent of each other. Your bids and payos in one round
have no impact on your payos in any other round.
How Are the Values Generated?
Your value and the value of the bidder you are matched with is generated in each round from a random
distribution. The probability of each possible value is given by the table below. You have been given a
printed copy of this table as well.
[Table 1 Here]
The values that you receive in any two rounds are \independent." This means that knowing your value
for any one round gives you no additional information about your values for other rounds. Likewise, the
values of the bidders matched with you are independent. Knowing the value of the bidder matched with you
in one round tells you nothing about the values of the bidders matched with you in other rounds.
How are the Signals Generated?
In each round you will receive a signal that gives you information about the value of the other bidder
you are matched with. The bidder you are matched with will also receive a signal about your value.
Your signal is correct 70% of the time. In other words, there is a 70% chance that your signal is exactly
equal to the realized value of your opponent. If you signal is incorrect, then each of the other values (dierent
from the realized value of your opponent) is equally likely to be drawn. In other words, there is a 3% chance
of drawing each of the incorrect values.
Your opponent also receives a signal about your realized value. His or her signal about your value is
generated in an analogous manner.
The signals that you receive in any two rounds about the values of other bidders are independent. This
means that knowing your signal for any one round gives you no additional information about what signals
will be in other rounds. Likewise, the signals of other bidders about your value are independent across
rounds.
Feedback
At the end of each round, the computer will give you a summary of the outcomes for the round. In
particular, it will tell you your value for the round, your bid, the bid of the other bidder you are matched
with and your payo for the round. You have a record sheet that you can use to record this information.
Payo in Dollars
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At the end of the experiment, the computer will select one of the rounds at random (all 20 rounds are
equally likely to be selected). Your ECU earnings for this round will be converted to dollars. The conversion
rate of ECU's to the dollar is 100 to 1. You will then be paid your converted earnings plus your 12 dollar
show-up fee. It is possible to lose money in a round of this experiment. If you have losses for the selected
round, these losses will be deducted from your 12 dollar show-up fee. In the extremely unlikely event that
you lose more than 12 dollars in the selected round, you will receive a monetary payo of $0.
You will be paid in cash at the conclusion of the experiment. You will be paid privately, and no other
bidder will be told what you earned for the experiment.
Summary
The experiment will consist of 20 rounds. In each round you will be randomly matched with another
bidder. In each round you and the bidder you are matched with will be given values for a unit of a ctitious
commodity. You will also be given a signal about the other bidder's value for this unit. Bidders will then bid
on the unit. The high bidder obtains the unit at a price equal to the second highest bid. The high bidder's
payo is equal to the dierence between his value and the second highest bid. All other bidders get a payo
of zero. At the end of the experiment, one of the 20 rounds will be randomly selected. You will be paid
your earnings for this round (converted from ECUs to dollars) plus your $12 show-up fee. You will be paid
in cash at the end of the experiment. All information about your choices and payos in this experiment will
be kept strictly condential.
Please do not talk with the other subjects at any point during the experiment, even to ask questions about
the instructions. If we hear you talking at any point in the experiment other than to talk with me or one of
my assistants, you will be removed from the room and will not receive any payment. You will be barred from
participating in any future economics experiments at Yale University (Case Western Reserve University).
If you have any questions about any part of the instructions, this would be a good time to raise your
hand. We want everyone to understand the instructions before we begin the experiment.
4
Quiz on Instructions: Part 1
Before we begin the experiment, we would like to conrm that everyone understands the instructions.
Please complete the following questions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The computer
will prompt you if you make an incorrect answer.
The rst part of this quiz asks you questions about the rules of the experiment. Assume that you have
drawn a value of 8,000 ECUs in round 1.
1. If you submit a bid of 5000 ECUs, and the other bidder you are matched with in round 1 has placed
a bid of 9,000 ECUs, what will your payo be in ECUs in round 1?
2. If you submit a bid of 6,500 ECUs, and the other bidder you are matched with in round 1 has placed
a bid of 6,000 ECUs, what will your payo be in ECUs in round 1?
3. If you submit a bid of 10,000 ECUs, and other bidder you are matched with in round 1 has placed a
bid of 9,000 ECUs, what will your payo be in ECUs in round 1?g
Quiz on Instructions: Part 2
Reminder: You have a table giving you the probability of drawing each value. The probability of
receiving a correct signal about your opponent's value is 70%.The probability of receiving each incorrect
possible signal is 3%.
1. What is the probability in percentages that you draw a value of 4,000 ECUs?
2. What is the probability in percentages that you draw a value of 7,000 ECUs?
3. If you have a value of 2,000 ECUs, what is the probability in percentages that the bidder you are
matched with has a value of 2,000 ECUs?
4. If you have a value of 8,000 ECUs in the current round, what is the probability in percentages that
you draw a value of 8,000 ECUs in the next round?
5. If the bidder you are matched with has a value of 3,000 ECUs, what is the probability in percentages
that you receive a signal of 3,000 ECUs?
6. If the bidder you are matched with has a value of 7,000 ECUs, what is the probability in percentages
that you receive a signal of 3,000 ECUs?
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Quiz on Instructions: Part 3
1. Does the bidder you are matched with know your value for sure? Yes No
2. Does the bidder you are matched with know your signal about his or her value for sure? Yes No
3. You will be matched with the same bidder in all 20 rounds. True False
4. We will pay you your converted payos from all 20 rounds. True False
5. After the experiment has nished, we will not tell any other bidder about the choices you have made.
True False
6. We will never let any other bidder know what payo you have received for participation in this
experiment. True False
We will now begin the experiment. If you have any questions at any point in the experiment, please raise
you hand and we will answer your question as fully as possible. Please feel free to make as much money as
you can!!!
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